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How to Measure Loss of Privacy
Luc Longpré and Vladik Kreinovich
Department of Computer Science
University of Texas at El Paso
500 W. University
El Paso, TX 79968, USA
{longpre,vladik}@utep.edu
Abstract
To compare different schemes for preserving privacy, it is important
to be able to gauge loss of privacy. Since loss of privacy means that we
gain new information about a person, it seems natural to measure the
loss of privacy by the amount of information that we gained. However,
this seemingly natural definition is not perfect: when we originally know
that a person’s salary is between $10,000 and $20,000 and later learn that
the salary is between $10,000 and $15,000, we gained exactly as much
information (one bit) as when we learn that the salary is an even number
– however, intuitively, in the first case, we have a substantial privacy
loss while in the second case, the privacy loss is minimal. In this paper,
we propose a new definition of privacy loss that is in better agreement
with our intuition. This new definition is based on estimating worst-case
financial losses caused by the loss of privacy.
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Introduction

Measuring loss of privacy is important. Privacy means, in particular,
that we do not disclose all the information about ourselves. If some of the
originally un-disclosed information is disclosed, some privacy is lost. To compare
different privacy protection schemes, we must be able to gauge the resulting loss
of privacy.
Seemingly natural idea: measuring loss of privacy by the acquired
amount of information. Since privacy means that we do not have complete
information about a person, a seemingly natural idea is to gauge the loss of
privacy by the amount of new information that we gained about this person;
see, e.g., [1, 7].
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The traditional Shannon’s notion of the amount of information is based on
defining information as the (average) number of “yes”-“no” (binary) questions
that we need to ask so that, starting with the initial uncertainty, we will be able
to completely determine the object.
After each binary question, we can have 2 possible answers. So, if we ask
q binary questions, then, in principle, we can have 2q possible results. Thus, if
we know that our object is one of n objects, and we want to uniquely pinpoint
the object after all these questions, then we must have 2q ≥ n. In this case, the
smallest number of questions is the smallest integer q that is ≥ log2 (n). This
smallest number is called a ceiling and denoted by dlog2 (n)e.
For discrete probability distributions,
we get the standard formula for the
P
average number of questions − pi · log2 (pi ). For the continuous case, we can
estimate the average number of questions that are needed to find an object with
a given accuracy ε – i.e., divide the whole original domain into sub-domains of
radius ε and diameter 2ε.
For example, if we start with an interval [L, U ] of width U − L, then we need
to subdivide it into n ∼ (U − L)/(2ε) sub-domains, so we must ask log2 (n) ∼
log2 (U − L) − log2 (ε) − 1 questions. In the limit, the term that does not depend
on ε leads to log2 (U − L). For continuous probability distributions, we Rget the
standard Shannon’s expression log2 (n) ∼ S − log2 (2ε), where S = − ρ(x) ·
log2 ρ(x) dx [4, 5, 6]; see Appendix for the derivation of this Shannon’s formula.
Often, this definition is in good accordance with our intuition. In
some cases, the above definition is in good accordance with the intuitive notion
of a loss of privacy. As an example, let us consider the case when our only
information about some parameter x is that the (unknown) actual value of this
parameter x belongs to the (unknown) interval [L, U ]. In this case, the amount
of information is proportional to log2 (U − L). If we learn a narrower interval
containing x, e.g., if we learn that the actual value of x belongs to the left half
def
[u, l] = [L, (L + U )/2] of the original interval, then the resulting amount of
information is reduced to
log2 ((L + U )/2 − L) = log2 ((U − L)/2) = log2 (U − L) − 1.
Thus, by learning the narrower interval for x, we gained log2 (U − L) − (log2 (U −
L) − 1) = 1 bit of new information.
The narrower the new interval, the smaller the resulting new amount of
information, so the larger the information gain.
The above definition is not always perfect. In some other situations,
however, the above definition is not in perfect accordance with our intuition.
Indeed, when we originally knew that a person’s salary is between $10,000
and $20,000 and later learn that the salary is between $10,000 and $15,000, we
gained one bit of information. On the other hand, if the only new information
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that we learned is that the salary is an even number, we also learn exactly one
bit of new information. However, intuitively:
• in the first case, we have a substantial privacy loss, while
• in the second case, the direct privacy loss is minimal.
Comment. It is worth mentioning that while the direct privacy loss is small,
the information about evenness may indirect lead to a huge privacy loss. The
fact that the salary is even means that we know its remainder modulo 2. If, in
addition, we learn the remainder of the salary modulo 3, 5, etc., then we can
can combine these seemingly minor pieces of information and use the Chinese
remainder theorem (see, e.g., [3]) to uniquely reconstruct the salary.
What we plan to do. The main objective of this paper is to propose a new
definition of privacy loss which is in better accordance with our intuition.
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Our Main Idea

Why information is not always a perfect measure of loss of privacy.
In our opinion, the amount of new information is not always a good measure of
the loss of privacy because it does not distinguish between:
• crucial information that may seriously affect a person, and
• irrelevant information – that may not affect a person at all.
To make a distinction between these two types of information, let us estimate
potential financial losses caused by the loss of privacy.
Example when loss of privacy can lead to a financial loss. As an example, let us consider how a person’s blood pressure x affects the premium that
this person pays for his or her health insurance.
From the previous experience, insurance companies can deduce, for each
value of blood pressure x, the expected (average) value of the medical expenses
f (x) of all individuals with this particular value of blood pressure. So, when
the insurance company knows the exact value x of a person’s blood pressure, it
def
can offer this person an insurance rate F (x) = f (x) · (1 + α), where α is the
general investment profit. Indeed:
• If an insurance company offers higher rates, then its competitor will be
able to offer lower rates and still make a profit.
• On the other hand, if the insurance company is selling insurance at a
lower rate, then it will not earn enough profit, and investors will pull their
money out and invest somewhere else.
3

To preserve privacy, we only keep the information that the blood pressure of
all individuals from a certain group is between two bounds L and U , and we do
not know have any additional information about the blood pressure of different
individuals. Under this information, how much will the insurance company
charge to insure people from this group?
Based on the past experience, the insurance company is able to deduce the
relative frequency of different values x ∈ [L, U ] – e.g., in the form of the corresponding probability density ρ(x). In this case, the expected medical expenses
def R
of an average person from this group are equal to E[f (x)] = ρ(x) · f (x) dx.
Thus,
the insurance company will insure the person for a cost of E[F (x)] =
R
ρ(x) · F (x) dx.
Let us now assume that for some individual, the privacy is lost, and for this
individual, we know the exact value x0 of his or her blood pressure. For this
individual, the company can now better predict its medical expenses as f (x0 )
and thus, offer a new rate F (x0 ) = f (x0 ) · (1 + α). When F (x0 ) > E[F (x)], the
person whose privacy is lost also experiences a financial loss F (x0 ) − E[F (x)].
We will use this financial loss to gauge the loss of privacy.
Need for a worst-case comparison. In the above example, there is a financial loss only if the person’s blood pressure x0 is worse than average. A person
whose blood pressure is lower than average will only benefit from reduced insurance rates.
However, in a somewhat different situation, if the person’s blood pressure
is smaller (better) than average, this person’s loss or privacy can also lead to
a financial loss. For example, an insurance company may, in general, pay for a
preventive medication that lowers the risk of heart attacks – and of the resulting
huge medical expenses. The higher the blood pressure, the larger the risk of
a heart attack. So, if the insurance company learns that a certain individual
has a lower-than-average blood pressure and thus, a lower-than-average risk of a
heart attack, this risk may not justify the expenses on the preventive medication.
Thus, due to a privacy loss, the individual will have to pay for this potentially
beneficial medication from his/her own pocket – and thus, also experience a
financial loss.
So, to gauge a privacy loss, we must consider not just a single situation,
but several different situations, and gauge the loss of privacy by the worst-case
financial loss caused by this loss of privacy.
Which functions F (x) should we consider. In different situations, we
may have different functions F (x) that describe the dependence of a (predicted)
financial gain on the (unknown) actual value of a parameter x.
This prediction only makes sense only if we can predict F (x) for each person
with a reasonable accuracy, e.g., with an accuracy ε > 0. Measurements are
never 100% accurate, and measurement of x are not exception. Let us denote by
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δ the accuracy with which we measure x, i.e., the upper bound on the (absolute
def

value of) the difference ∆x = x
e − x between the measured value x
e and the
(unknown) actual value x. Due to this difference, the estimated value F (e
x)
is different from the ideal prediction F (x). Usually, measurement errors ∆x
def

are small, so we can expand the prediction inaccuracy ∆F = F (e
x) − F (x) =
F (x + ∆x) − F (x) in Taylor series in ∆x and ignore quadratic and higher order
terms in this expansion, leading to ∆F ≈ F 0 (x) · ∆x. Since the largest possible
value of ∆x is δ, the largest possible value for ∆F is thus |F 0 (x)| · δ. Since
this value should not exceed ε, we thus conclude that |F 0 (x)| · δ ≤ ε, i.e., that
def

|F 0 (x)| ≤ M = ε/δ.
Resulting definitions.

Thus, we arrive at the following definition:

Definition 1. Let P be a class of probability distributions on a real line, and
let M > 0 be a real number. By the amount of privacy A(P)
related to P, we
R
mean the largest possible value of the difference F (x0 ) − ρ(x) · F (x) dx over:
• all possible values x0 ,
• all possible probability distributions ρ ∈ P, and
• all possible functions F (x) for which |F 0 (x)| ≤ M for all x.
The above definition involves taking a maximum over all distributions ρ ∈ P
which are consistent with the known information about the group to which a
given individual belongs. In some cases, we know the exact probability distribution, so the family P consists of only one distribution. In other situations,
we may not know this distribution. For example, we may only know that the
value of x is within the interval [L, U ], and we do not know the probabilities
of different values within this interval. In this case, the class P consists of all
distributions which are located on this interval (with probability 1).
When we learn new information about this individual, we thus reduce the
group and hence, change from the original class P to a new class Q. This
change, in general, decreases the amount of privacy.
In particular, when we learn the exact value x0 of the parameter, then the
resulting class of distribution reduces to a singleR distribution concentrated on
this x0 with probability 1 – for which F (x0 ) − ρ(x) · F (x) dx = 0 and thus,
the privacy is 0. In this case, we have a 100% loss of privacy – from the original
value A(P) to 0. In other cases, we may have a partial loss of privacy.
In general, it is reasonable to define the relative loss of privacy as a ratio
A(P) − A(Q)
.
A(P)
In other words, it is reasonable to use the following definition:
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(1)

Definition 2.
• By a privacy loss, we mean a pair hP, Qi of classes of probability distributions.
• For each privacy loss hP, Qi, by the measure of a privacy loss, we mean
the ratio (1).
Comment. At first glance, it may sound as if these definitions depend on an
(unknown) value of the parameter M . However, it is easy to see that the actual
measure of the privacy loss does not depend on M :
Proposition 1. For each pair hP, Qi, the measure of the privacy loss is the
same for all M > 0.
Proof. To prove this proposition, it is sufficient to show that for each M > 0,
the measure of privacy loss is the same for this M and for M0 = 1. Indeed, for
each function F (x) for which |F 0 (x)| ≤ M for all x, for the re-scaled function
def

F0 (x) = F (x)/M , we have |F00 (x)| ≤ 1 for all x, and
µ
¶
Z
Z
F (x0 ) − ρ(x) · F (x) dx = M · F0 (x0 ) − ρ(x) · F0 (x) dx .

(2)

Vice versa, if |F00 (x)| ≤ 1 for all x, for the re-scaled function
def

F (x) = M · F0 (x),
we have |F 0 (x)| ≤ M for all x, and (2). Thus, the maximized values corresponding to M and M0 = 1 different by a factor M . Hence, the resulting amounts
of privacy A(P) and A0 (P) corresponding to M and M0 also differ by a factor
M : A(P) = M · A0 (P). Substituting this expression for A(P) (and a similar
expression for A(Q)) into the definition (1), we can therefore conclude that
A(P) − A(Q)
A0 (P) − A0 (Q)
=
,
A(P)
A0 (P)
i.e., that the measure of privacy is indeed the same for M and M0 = 1. The
proposition is proven.

3

The New Definition of Privacy Loss Is in Good
Agreement with Intuition

Let us show that the new definition adequately describes the difference between
learning that the parameter is in the lower half of the original interval and that
the parameter if even.
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Proposition 2. Let [l, u] ⊆ [L, U ] be intervals, let P be the class of all probability distributions located on the interval [L, U ], and let Q be the class of all
probability distributions located on the interval [l, u]. For this pair hP, Qi, the
measure of the privacy loss if equal to
1−

u−l
.
U −L

Proof. Due to Proposition 1, for computing the measure of the privacy loss,
it is sufficient consider the case M = 1. Let us show that for this M , we have
A(P) = U − L.
Let us first show that for every x0 ∈ [L, U ], for every probability distribution
ρ(x) on the interval [L, UR], and for every function F (x) for which |F 0 (x)| ≤ 1,
the privacy loss FR(x0 ) − ρ(x) · F (x) dx does notR exceed U − L.
Indeed, since ρ(x) dx = 1, we have F (x0 ) = ρ(x) · F (x0 ) dx and hence,
Z
Z
F (x0 ) − ρ(x) · F (x) dx = ρ(x) (F (x0 ) − F (x)) dx.
Since |F 0 (x)| ≤ 1, we conclude that |F (x0 )−F (x)| ≤ |x0 −x|. Both x0 and x are
within the interval [L, U ],
R hence |x0 − x| ≤ U − L, and |F (x0 ) − F (x)| ≤ U − L.
Thus, the average value ρ(x) · (F (x0 ) − F (x)) dx of this difference also cannot
exceed U − L.
Let us now show that there exists a value x0 ∈ [L, U ], a probability distri0
bution ρ(x) on the interval [L, U ], and
R a function F (x) for which |F (x)| ≤ 1,
for which the privacy loss F (x0 ) − ρ(x) · F (x) dx is exactly U − L. As such
an example, we take F (x) = x, x0 = U , and ρ(x) located at a point x = L with
probability 1. In this case, the privacy loss is equal to F (U ) − F (L) = U − L.
Similarly, we can prove that A(Q) = u − l, so we get the desired measure of
the privacy loss. The proposition is proven.
Comment. In particular, if we start with an interval [L, U ], and then we learn
that the actual value x is in the lower half [L, (L + U )/2] of this interval, then
we get a 50% privacy loss.
What about the case when we assume that x is even? Similarly to the proof
of the above proposition, one can prove that if both L and U are even, and Q is
the class of all distributions ρ(x) which are located, with probability 1, on even
values x, we get A(Q) = A(P). Thus, the even-values restriction lead to a 0%
privacy loss.
Thus, the new definition of the privacy loss is indeed in good agreement with
our intuition.
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Appendix: How to Measure the Amount of Information
In the main text, we use Shannon’s estimates for the average number of binary
questions. Let us recall, in detail, how this number is estimated for probability
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distributions. The need for such a reminder comes from the fact that while most
researchers are familiar with Shannon’s formula for the amount of information,
most researchers are not aware how this formula was (or can be) derived.
Discrete case: no information about probabilities. Let us start with
the simplest situation when we know that we have n possible alternatives
A1 , . . . , An , and we have no information about the probability (frequency) of different alternatives. Let us show that in this case, the smallest number of binary
def
questions that we need to determine the alternative is indeed q = dlog2 (n)e.
We have already shown that the number of questions cannot be smaller than
dlog2 (n)e; so, to complete the derivation, it is let us show that it is sufficient to
ask q questions.
Indeed, let’s enumerate all n possible alternatives (in arbitrary order) by
numbers from 0 to n − 1, and write these numbers in the binary form. Using
q binary digits, one can describe numbers from 0 to 2q − 1. Since 2q ≥ n,
we can this describe each of the n numbers by using only q binary digits. So,
to uniquely determine the alternative Ai out of n given ones, we can ask the
following q questions: “is the first binary digit 0?”, “is the second binary digit
0?”, etc, up to “is the q-th digit 0?”.
Case of a discrete probability distribution. Let us now assume that we
also know the probabilities p1 , . . . , pn of different alternatives A1 , . . . , An . If we
are interested in an individual selection, then the above arguments show that we
cannot determine the actual alternative by using fewer than log(n) questions.
However, if we have many (N ) similar situations in which we need to find an
alternative, then we can determine all N alternatives by asking ¿ N · log2 (n)
binary questions.
To show this, let us fix i from 1 to n, and estimate the number of events Ni
in which the output is i.
This number Ni is obtained by counting all the events in which the output
was i, so Ni = n1 +n2 +. . .+nN , where nk equals to 1 if in k-th event the output
is i and 0 otherwise. The average E(nk ) of nk equals to pi · 1 + (1 − pi ) · 0 = pi .
The mean square deviation σ[nk ] is determined by the formula
σ 2 [nk ] = pi · (1 − E(nk ))2 + (1 − pi ) · (0 − E(nk ))2 .
If we substitute here E(nk ) = pi , we get σ 2 [nk ] = pi ·(1−pi ). The outcomes of all
these events are considered independent, therefore nk are independent random
variables. Hence the average value of Ni equals to the sum of the averages of
nk :
E[Ni ] = E[n1 ] + E[n2 ] + . . . + E[nN ] = N · pi .
The mean square deviation σ[Ni ] satisfies a likewise equation
σ 2 [Ni ] = σ 2 [n1 ] + σ 2 [n2 ] + . . . = N · pi · (1 − pi ),
9

p
so σ[Ni ] = pi · (1 − pi ) · N .
For big N the sum of equally distributed independent random variables
tends to a Gaussian distribution (the well-known central limit theorem), therefore for big N , we can assume that Ni is a random variable with a Gaussian
distribution. Theoretically a random Gaussian variable with the average a and
a standard deviation σ can take any value. However, in practice, if, e.g., one
buys a voltmeter with guaranteed 0.1V standard deviation, and it gives an error
1V, it means that something is wrong with this instrument. Therefore it is assumed that only some values are practically possible. Usually a “k-sigma” rule
is accepted that the real value can only take values from a − k · σ to a + k · σ,
where k isp2, 3, or 4. So in our case wepcan conclude that Ni lies between
N · pi − k · pi · (1 − pi ) · N and N · pi + k · pi · (1 − pi ) · N . Now we are ready
for the formulation of Shannon’s result.
Comment. In this quality control example the choice of k matters, but, as we’ll
see, in our case the results do not depend on k at all.
Definition A.1.
• Let a real number k > 0 and a positive integer n be given. The number n
is called the number of outcomes.
• By a probability
distribution, we mean a sequence {pi } of n real numbers,
P
pi ≥ 0,
pi = 1. The value pi is called a probability of i-th event.
• Let an integer N is given; it is called the number of events.
• By a result of N events we mean a sequence rk , 1 ≤ k ≤ N of integers
from 1 to n. The value rk is called the result of k-th event.
• The total number of events that resulted in the i-th outcome will be denoted
by Ni .
• We say that the result of N events is consistent with the probability distribution {pi } if for every i, we have N · pi − k · σi ≤ Ni ≤ N + k · σi , where
def p
σi = pi · (1 − pi ) · N .
• Let’s denote the number of all consistent results by Ncons (N ).
• The number dlog2 (Ncons (N ))e will be called the number of questions, necessary to determine the results of N events and denoted by Q(N ).
• The fraction Q(N )/N will be called the average number of questions.
• The limit of the average number of questions when N → ∞ will be called
the information.
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Theorem (Shannon). When the number of events N tends to infinity, the
average number of questions tends to
X
def
S(p) = −
pi · log2 (pi ).

Comments.
• Shannon’s theorem says that if we know the probabilities of all the outputs,
then the average number of questions that we have to ask in order to get a
complete knowledge equals to the entropy of this probabilistic distribution.
• As we promised, this average number of questions does not depend on the
threshold k.
• Since we somewhat modified Shannon’s definitions, we cannot use the
original proof. Our proof (and proof of other results) is given at the end
of this Appendix.
Case of a continuous probability distribution. After a finite number of
“yes”-“no” questions, we can only distinguish between finitely many alternatives. If the actual situation is described by a real number, then, since there are
infinitely many different possible real numbers, after finitely many questions,
we can only get an approximate value of this number.
Once we fix the accuracy ε > 0, we can talk about the number of questions that are necessary to determine a number x with this accuracy ε, i.e., to
determine an approximate value r for which |x − r| ≤ ε.
Once an approximate value r is determined, possible actual values of x form
an interval [r − ε, r + ε] of width 2ε. Vice versa, if we have located x on an
interval [x, x] of width 2ε, this means that we have found x with the desired
accuracy ε: indeed, as an ε-approximation to x, we can then take the midpoint
(x + x)/2 of the interval [x, x].
Thus, the problem of determining x with the accuracy ε can be reformulated
as follows: we divide the real line into intervals [xi , xi+1 ] of width 2ε (xi+1 =
xi + 2ε), and by asking binary questions, find the interval that contains x. As
we have shown, for this problem, the average number
P of binary question needed
to locate x with accuracy ε is equal to S = − pi · log2 (pi ), where pi is the
probability that x belongs to i-th interval [xi , xRi+1 ].
x
In general, this probability pi is equal to xii+1 ρ(x) dx, where ρ(x) is the
probability distribution of the unknown values x. For small ε, we have pi ≈
2ε · ρ(xi ), hence log2 (pi ) = log2 (ρ(xi )) + log2 (2ε). Therefore, for small ε, we
have
X
X
S=−
ρ(xi ) · log2 (ρ(xi )) · 2ε −
ρ(xi ) · 2ε · log2 (2ε).
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def

The
R first sum in this expression is the integral sum for the integral S(ρ) =
− ρ(x) · log2 (x) dx (this integral is called the entropy of the probability distribution ρ(x)); so, for small ε, this sum is approximately equal to this integral
(and tends to this integral when ε → 0). The second
sum is a constant log2 (2ε)
R
multiplied by an integral sum for the interval ρ(x) dx = 1. Thus, for small ε,
we have
Z
S ≈ − ρ(x) · log2 (x) dx − log2 (2ε).
So, the average number of binary questions that are needed to determine x with
a given accuracy ε, can be determined if we know the entropy of the probability
distribution ρ(x).
Proof of Shannon’s theorem. Let’s first fix some values Ni , that are consistent with the given probabilistic distribution. Due to the inequalities that
express the consistency demand, the ratio fi = Ni /N tends to pi as N → ∞.
Let’s count the total number C of results, for which for every i the number of
events with outcome i is equal to this Ni . If we know C, we will be able to
compute Ncons by adding these C’s.
Actually we are interested not in Ncons itself, but in Q(N ) ≈ log2 (Ncons ),
and moreover, in lim(Q(N )/N ). So we’ll try to estimate not only C, but also
log2 (C) and lim log2 (C)/N .
To estimate C means to count the total number of sequences of length N ,
in which there are N1 elements, equal to 1, N2 elements, equal to 2, etc. The
total number C1 of ways to choose
µ ¶N1 elements out of N is well-known in
N1
N!
combinatorics, and is equal to
=
. When we choose
N
(N1 )! · (N − N1 )!
these N1 elements, we have a problem in choosing N2 out of the remaining
N −N
µ1 elements,
¶ where the outcome is 2; so for every choice of 1’s we have
N2
C2 =
possibilities to choose 2’s. Therefore in order to get the total
N − N1
number of possibilities to choose 1’s and 2’s, we must multiply C2 by C1 . Adding
3’s, 4’s, . . . , n’s, we get finally the following formula for C:
C = C1 · C2 · . . . · Cn−1 =
N!
(N − N1 )!
N!
·
· ... =
N1 ! · (N − N1 )! N2 ! · (N − N1 − N2 )!
N1 ! · N2 ! · . . . · Nn !
To simplify computations let’s use the well-known Stirling formula k! ∼ (k/e)k ·
√
2π · k. Then, we get
µ ¶N
√
N
2π · N
e
C ≈ µ ¶N1
µ
¶Nn
√
√
N1
Nn
· 2π · N1 · . . . ·
· 2π · Nn
e
e
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P
Since
Ni = N , terms eN and eNi cancel each other.
To get further simplification, we substitute Ni = N · fi , and correspondingly
NiNi as (N · fi )N ·fi = N N ·fi · fi N ·fi . Terms N N is the numerator and
N N ·f1 · N N ·f2 . . . · N N ·fn = N N ·f1 +N ·f2 +...+N ·fn = N N
√
in the denominator cancel each other. Terms with N lead to a term that
depends on N as c · N −(n−1)/2 . So, we conclude that
log2 (C) ≈ −N · f1 · log2 (f1 ) − . . . − N · fn log2 (fn )−
n−1
· log2 (N ) − const.
2
When N → ∞, we have 1/N → 0, log2 (N )/N → 0, and fi → pi , therefore
log2 (C)
→ −p1 · log2 (p1 ) − . . . − pn · log2 (pn ),
N
i.e., log2 (C)/N tends to the entropy of the probabilistic distribution.
Arguments given in [2] show that the ratio Q(N )/N = S also tends to this
entropy. The theorem is proven.
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